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Abstract  The New Rhetoric identifies the self-deliberator as  
 one of three main types of audience. But such a  
 turn toward the self is at odds with studies of 
contemporary argumentation, particularly social argumentation. 
Argumentation takes place “out there”, modifying the 
environments in which audiences operate. Equally interesting 
is the use of self-deliberation as a rhetorical strategy. Arguing 
with oneself, especially when that self is distanced in some way 
from the individual involved, employs self-deliberation beyond 
the ends that Perelman assigned to it. In this paper, my goal is to 
explore the nature of the self-deliberator as an audience and self-
deliberation as a rhetorical strategy employed in argumentation.
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La autodeliberación y la estrategia del 
pseudodiálogo
Resumen  La Nueva Retórica identifica al autodeliberador  
 como uno de los tres tipos principales de audiencia.  
 Pero dicho giro hacia el yo no guarda concordancia 
con los estudios contemporáneos de la argumentación, 
particularmente en cuanto a lo social. La argumentación ocurre 
“allí afuera” y modifica los ambientes donde operan las audiencias. 
Resulta igualmente interesante el uso de la autodeliberación 
como estrategia retórica. En la argumentación con uno mismo, 
especialmente cuando dicho ser se encuentra de alguna manera 
alejado de la persona involucrada, se utiliza la autodeliberación 
más allá de los fines que Perelman le asignó. El objetivo del 
presente artículo es explorar las características del autodeliberador 
como audiencia y la autodeliberación como estrategia retórica 
empleada en la argumentación.
Palabras clave:
Esquemas de argumentación, Booth, Descartes, estrategia retóri-
ca, autodeliberación.
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Introduction: Ambrose and the Inward Turn
Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan, presented a puzzle to those who 
visited him. In Book vi of the Confessions, Augustine says of Ambrose:
When he was reading, his eyes ran over the page and his heart perceived 
the sense, but his voice and tongue were silent. He did not restrict access to 
anyone coming in, nor was it customary even for a visitor to be announced. 
Very often when we were there, we saw him silently reading and never 
otherwise. After sitting a long time in silence […] we used to go away 
(1991, pp. 92-93).
Thus, we are invited to picture a scene where several people are 
standing around watching someone else reading, and after a time, 
simply going away. The story is doubly strange because it describes 
behaviour that we would find perfectly natural (at least on the 
reader’s part). For those witnessing it, however, this phenomenon 
is sufficiently unusual that it deserves to be remarked in this way. 
Moreover, it demands more than just a description; it must also be 
explained. Augustine speculates on the causes: perhaps Ambrose 
wants to avoid having to expound a difficult passage to interested 
hearers and so getting caught up in debate, thereby giving him the 
time to get through more books; or perhaps he wants to preserve his 
voice. Whatever the explanation, Augustine assures us (and himself) 
that “this man had a good reason for what he did” (1991, p. 93). The 
Pusey translation makes clearer the ethotic appeal here: whatever the 
intent “certainly in such a man it was good” (Augustine, 1961, p. 82).
This restoration of Ambrose’s mind by reading (Augustine, 
1991, p. 92) evokes a now-lost sense of recreation. Canadian author 
Robertson Davies in his diaries refers to a time during the construction 
of Massey College in Toronto when he returned home too tired to 
“recreate himself” (2015). This conveys the sense of the self having 
been dispersed over the course of the day, and requiring an activity 
in which that self is collected and rebalanced, or recreated.
Two things emerge from these anecdotes: (i) that for some, 
the self is something that can become fractured and disassembled, 
needing various activities to compose it afresh, one of which is 
reading, but all of which would involve introspection of some variety; 
and (ii) such activities require a turn away from normal social life, 
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which, on Augustine’s testimony, would have been characterized by 
the communal activities of debate or reading texts aloud, vestiges, 
perhaps, of the oral traditions of the past.
On the face of things, this turning toward the self is a phenomenon 
in opposition to the movements of argumentation, particularly social 
argumentation, which moves centrifugally towards an audience. 
Argumentation takes place “out there”, modifying the environments 
in which audiences operate. But Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
(1969) also identified among the central notions of audience (along 
with the single hearer and the universal audience) the deliberating 
subject. While some commentators find the idea of the self as an 
audience improbable if not incomprehensible (see Johnson, 2013), 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca insist that this audience plays an 
important normative role when an individual “deliberates or gives 
himself reasons for his actions” (1969, p. 30). Perelman himself 
having raised the question “What is this audience around which 
argumentation is centered?” (1982, p. 13) repeats the definition of 
the New Rhetoric, that it is the gathering (or ensemble) of those who 
the speaker wishes to influence. Such a “gathering” would seem by 
its suggested plural nature to preclude the subject who deliberates, but 
Perelman immediately claims otherwise: “What is this gathering? It is 
highly changeable. It can be the speaker himself, reflecting privately 
about how to respond to a delicate situation” (p. 14).
Equally interesting to the idea of the self-deliberator as a type of 
audience is the way certain scholars have turned self-deliberation 
into a rhetorical strategy. Arguing with oneself, especially when 
that self is distanced in some way from the individual involved, 
through anonymity or across time, employs self-deliberation beyond 
the ends that Perelman assigned to it. Yet the latter phenomenon 
would seem in some way to depend on or be associated with the 
former. In this paper, my goal is to explore the nature of the self-
deliberator as an audience and self-deliberation as a rhetorical 
strategy employed in argumentation.
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Self-deliberator as Audience: Perelman’s Account
A barrier to thinking of the self as an audience is the distinct 
roles played by arguer and audience. Arguers address audiences, 
and audiences are addressed. The roles can be reversed during 
argumentative exchanges, and often are, but the roles cannot be held 
simultaneously. Situations in which argumentation arises maintain 
a distance between the roles. So, becoming one’s own audience 
during deliberation seems at best atypical. Ambrose searched for 
meaning in his heart and not through a shared experience, but in 
all other respects his activity was no different than before. Is the self-
deliberator so different?
Of course, we have no difficulty with the idea of self-deliberation 
itself; it is a natural form of introspection. We weigh reasons, think 
through alternatives, dismiss claims, and draw conclusions, all 
as part of the process of reasoning. We work out the details of a 
case, organize it appropriately, and then present it to others, seeking 
their approval as we have found it ourselves.1 What Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca do that prompts resistance is introduce the notion 
of audience into this structure. In this way, they recast the process 
as one that mirrors the social experience. I am an audience to myself 
as I am an audience to others. It is that as which bears consideration.
While allowing that self-deliberation is characterized by special 
features, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca still focus on it as a particular 
kind of argumentation distinct from the traditional privileging of 
individualistic speech. Such an attitude has encouraged looking 
in the wrong direction–first to the self, then to others. They argue 
against this view: “Agreement with oneself is merely a particular 
case of agreement with others. Accordingly, from our point of view, 
it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that we can best 
understand self-deliberation and not vice versa” (1969, p. 41).
This direction of movement may seem counterintuitive to 
some, perhaps influenced by Descartes’ claim that all he can know 
is his own thinking nature and that knowledge needs to be built 
1 I leave outside the perimeters of this study the question of whether it is better to 
deliberate alone, or what benefits might be involved. This has been explored elsewhere 
(See Hample, 2018, p. 142; Gilbert, 2014).
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up (and outward) from there, or believing that humans evolved 
out of competition rather than cooperation. But recent work on 
the evolution of arguing has suggested that humans first learned 
to argue cooperatively together, persuading each other in social 
setting and as a result of that experience then learned to reason 
internally (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 109ff.; Hample, 2018, p. 144ff. 
See also Santibáñez Yáñez, 2012). Such studies support many of the 
intuitions in the New Rhetoric project. Hample captures the point 
succinctly when, speaking of the Mercier and Sperber account, he 
observes: “If reasoning developed as a sort of self-defense […] then it 
has an essentially social origin, not a private interior genesis. We can 
certainly think when we are alone, but the natural site for reasoning 
was in interaction with other people” (2018, p. 146).
Much of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s subsequent discussion 
involves ways in which a decision is justified or rationalized with 
reasons that were not apparent at the moment of decision. Thus, the 
self-deliberator is often deemed to be involved in such a process of 
rationalization. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, argumentation 
is always a function of the audience being addressed. Insofar as 
self-deliberation involves argumentation, it must also involve an 
audience. “Consequently”, they conclude, “it is legitimate that the 
person who has acquired a certain conviction should be at pains 
to strengthen it for himself and, more especially, against possible 
attack from without” (1969, p. 44). In such a manner, with new 
reasons, a conviction is intensified. Argumentation is not just aimed 
at persuasion; among its many goals is the reinforcement of premises 
to which one already adheres. Moreover, there is an expectation of 
consistency between the arguments a person puts forward to others 
and the arguments that person accepts.
So, much of what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have to say 
about the self-deliberator as audience suggests processes preliminary 
to making an argument public, but it is no less argumentative in 
nature. Individuals understand the positions they hold by finding 
the reasons that support them. Or they reinforce their positions with 
further reasons that strengthen their adherence. Understanding and 
reinforcement are thus important outcomes of the argumentation 
addressed to this audience, quite apart from the traditional sense 
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of deliberation that involves the weighing of reasons in coming to 
a conclusion. This reinforcement can be extended to accommodate 
the kinds of reconstitution implied by the traditional sense of 
recreation; rebuilding the self and its beliefs anew by strengthening 
the structure of adherences on which it is erected.
Also assumed here is a certain conception of the ‘self’. Later in 
the New Rhetoric project, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss 
the relationship between a person and the acts they perform. This 
arises in the section of the work that deals with argumentation 
based on the structure of reality (rather than that which establishes 
that structure), so there is a necessary assumption of stability 
assigned to the person; it is part of the reality, part of the given in an 
argumentative situation (1969, p. 300). This stability is what allows 
us to anticipate a person’s actions. We expect their character, formed 
over time, to influence what they do, or don’t do. Thus, we are not 
surprised when someone acts as expected, and we are surprised when 
they act in ways that we judge to be “out of character”. No action 
is ever guaranteed, but it is more or less likely: “As another person’s 
intention cannot be known directly, it can be presumed only from 
what is known of the permanent aspects of the person. Sometimes 
intention is revealed by repeated, concordant acts, but there are 
cases in which it can be determined only from the idea one has of 
the agent” (p. 301).
At the same time, argumentation is an important element in 
the development of personhood, and they recognize this. As much 
as the person has a stable structure at any particular time, it is still 
undergoing change: “the construction of the person is never finished, 
not even at his death” (p. 296). So, there is a tension here between 
the person or self2 that underlies the relatively fixed character (that in 
turn underlies the acts) and the future self that is in process, and that 
may act otherwise, and believe otherwise, and even argue otherwise.
This is not the place to explore the role that argumentation 
plays in developing and maintaining personhood;3 the point to 
2 In spite of the recognized differences involved in these concepts, I use the terms 
synonymously for the purposes of this discussion.
3 I explore this elsewhere. See Tindale (2011). I will discuss something of the nature of the 
self below.
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carry forward is that the self addressed in self-deliberation, the audience 
in question, may not be the fixed self seeking justifying reasons but 
the future self who is yet to act. C. S. Peirce makes a similar point: 
“Let anybody call to mind some recent earnest self-deliberation, and I 
think he will acknowledge that it took a dialogic form, every reasoning 
appealing to the self of the near following moment of time for assent 
and confirmation” (Peirce, 1998, pp. 428-429).4 The self I must persuade, 
with whom I deliberate, may not be the self of the present, but the self 
of the next moment. I am not static; I am a dynamic force in motion, 
using similarly dynamic processes at my disposal. The audience I must 
persuade and move to action lies (just) in the future. This was a point 
already argued by Socrates in Plato’s dialogues.
Socrates the Self-deliberator
There is something of the silent reader in the self-deliberator, 
taking a public practice and retreating with it into the private sphere. 
But if the silent reader is inaugurated in Ambrose, the introspective 
reasoner has an earlier precedent in the figure of Socrates.
Socratic inquiry is, to a degree, an invitation to self-deliberation. 
As Mercier and Sperber put it, “help your interlocutors see in their 
own beliefs reasons to change their views” (2017, p. 197). This–what 
we might call–”assisted-self-deliberation”, captures the nature of 
Socratic argument as it is invested in the so-called experts that he 
meets.5 In soliciting a claim from an interlocutor (usually related to a 
definition that would express that person’s expertise), Socrates then 
invites the individual to explore that claim with him, to test it to see 
if the person has the knowledge to support it. This involves going 
back into the belief system of the interlocutor. This is a direction of 
travel that argument encourages. Where does the argument take us? 
asks Socrates. It should take us back into ourselves to understand 
our own position. And, as we have seen, this is part of the project of 
self-deliberation, using argument to understand oneself.
4 I am grateful to Philip Rose for drawing this to my attention.
5 This is generally termed elenctic argument, or refutation. I would distinguish it from 
other types of Socratic argument like the hortatory or maieutic, but such concerns are 
beyond the current discussion.
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This is distinct, however, from Socrates’ own self-deliberative 
practice, in which he uses himself as an audience that he needs to 
persuade. We see this in dialogues like the Phaedo, Theaetetus, and 
Greater Hippias.6
In the dialogues that he devotes to the Sophists (and they are 
frequently present in the Platonic corpus), Plato presents them as 
exponents of public argument. In this, they express the negative, 
counterside to the kind of invitational, communal argumentation 
fostered in the Dialogues. But there is a very different treatment 
of argument conveyed through some of the statements of Socrates. 
In the Phaedo, for example, after criticizing the Sophists for giving 
argument a bad reputation and thereby leading people to hate it, 
Socrates advocates the pursuit of truth and knowledge through 
the use of good arguments (90d). He then surprises us, perhaps, by 
claiming that what is important is not persuading those who hear 
him, but rather himself: “I shall not be eager to make what I say 
seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall 
be very eager to make myself believe it” (91b). And how might he 
make himself believe what he says? This advocacy of introspection 
seems quite at odds with the general Socratic practice of “reasoning 
together” to ascertain what is true. Until we consider that there is 
still a dialogue involved, but this time an internal one.
A passage in the Theaetetus makes this clear. There, Socrates 
defines thought as a speech (logos) that the soul has with itself: “the 
soul is conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, 
affirming and denying” (190a). In ways that invite further study, this 
passage takes the typical Socratic Method of questions and answers 
and internalizes it, making the questioner and answerer, the speaker 
and audience, one and the same person.
This sense of the self as an audience for its own deliberations is 
nowhere clearer than in an extended discussion between Socrates 
and the Sophist Hippias in the Greater Hippias. Hippias is an 
advocate of the large, expansive speech, and contrasts this with the 
Socratic propensity for the “flakings and clippings of speeches”. This 
6 Elsewhere (Tindale, 2010) I have called this “private argument”, to contrast it with the 
public, communal practices of argumentation promoted in the dialogues.
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approach takes the mass of a thing and divides it up with words, 
freezing things in isolation for examination, and tearing them from 
the natural flux. Hippias is concerned that this separates things from 
their natural context.7 What Hippias values is to be able to present a 
speech well, and to successfully persuade others of one’s case (304b).
There is more to the exchange between Hippias and Socrates 
over the relative merits of types of speech. But of greater interest 
is a strategy employed in the Greater Hippias. Socrates does not 
directly attack the points raised by Hippias, instead he invokes a 
shadowy dissenter (someone who he accuses of questioning him 
quite insultingly, 286c-d), and then he takes on the persona of that 
other man, so that Hippias is to answer Socrates as if this other 
is the actual questioner (287c). Socrates stresses how important it 
is that he, Socrates, be able to convince this other man, who he 
eventually identifies as Sophronicus’ son, that is, Socrates himself: 
“who wouldn’t easily let me say those things without testing them” 
(298c). Let us be clear about what is being presented here: Socrates 
requires from Hippias an argument that he can take away and use to 
convince a third party, who turns out to be Socrates himself.
What strategy is behind the employment of this device?8 Perhaps 
it is to allow Socrates to insult someone who is so antithetical to 
everything that Plato represents, given Hippias’ boasting of his 
proficiency in so many areas. Thus, Hippias is thought to be the 
Sophist who Plato sees most fit for ridicule. But Socrates states often 
that he agrees with the insults of this other man, so he is hardly 
a buffer between the insults and the person insulted. Rather, we 
might see in this device Plato stressing here (as he does elsewhere) 
a preference for private, internal argumentation over that which 
is public. Where Hippias promotes argumentation in the public 
domain, Plato, on this occasion, promotes the internal dialogue of 
self-deliberation. Socrates’ venture into the public, on these terms, is 
to harvest arguments with which he can withdraw into the private 
sphere and deliberate upon.
7 The same point is made in the Lesser Hippias (369b-c).
8 See Woodruff (1982, p. 43, n47; p. 108) for a discussion of the controversy surrounding 
Plato’s use of this device. Some see it as non-Platonic, but Woodruff makes a strong case 
for its authenticity.
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Two things might be noted here: (i) when Socrates’ interlocutors 
are invited to reflect on their own statements, making of themselves 
an audience for their own investigations, the self involved is one of a 
present time, already constituted and in possession of beliefs that are 
to be justified or not; while for Socrates, when he deliberates with 
himself, his audience is a self of a future time, one who does not yet 
hold such a belief but is open to considering it. (ii) The device in the 
Greater Hippias, while making the point clearer than in the earlier 
passages from other dialogues, is also demonstrative in a way they 
are not. Socrates conjures up an explicit other (Sophronicus’ son) 
with whom to deliberate. As such he will inaugurate a rhetorical 
strategy that can be shared by others, as we will see in section 5. 
The recourse to such a device here might also suggest that we are 
witnessing something that is conceptually new and difficult to 
convey. Thus, a short discursive on how the self has been read in 
Plato is in order.
The Self that Deliberates
It might be objected that the sense of the self that interests 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca when they assert the self-deliberator 
as a type of audience is a far more developed metaphysical entity 
than any sense of self that would have been recognized by Plato. 
Whether the Ancients had a “modern” notion of the self has been 
the subject of serious discussion in the relevant literature. In the 
space I have here, I will restrict the discussion to the “pro” case.
As Christopher Gill (2006, 1991) observes, there are clear 
dangers in reading a modern conception of the self back onto Greek 
thought. He finds no uncontroversial grounds for identifying a 
modern (post-Cartesian) notion of “person” in Greek thought (1991, 
p. 193). Others expect to see a development of ideas from the Greeks 
through to modern times, and so, perhaps unsurprisingly, find such 
a development present. Charles Kahn (1988), for example, sees the 
idea of an individualized “I” of “personal identity” first emerging in 
Epictetus and his use of the term prohairesis (translated as “choice” 
or “decision”–Kahn, 1988, p. 53).
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What the passages I have explored would seem to confirm is a 
conception of the person as what Gill has called “in dialogue”, where 
the person becomes the focal point of three related types of dialogue: 
dialogue with others as engaged participants in society; dialogues 
with others in debate over the principles of human experience; and 
an internal dialogue between the parts of the psyche (Gill, 1996, 
passim). All three are viable senses of dialogue in Plato’s work, with 
the first two receiving the bulk of attention. It is the last of these 
that I have stressed, but the relationship between them is something 
to be considered.
Dialogues with the Self: Descartes and Booth
There might not be two more unlikely companions than René 
Descartes, the anti-rhetorical rationalist, and Wayne C. Booth, the 
rhetorical theorist and literary critic. But both found merit in the 
strategy of dialoguing with the self, Descartes through the creation 
of an anonymous correspondent, and Booth through dialogue with 
his 14-year-old former self. In both cases, we see the introduction of 
an audience with whom the writer enters a dialogue. My interest is 
in what might be achieved by the use of such a strategy.
The author here is distanced from himself, creating another 
stance through which to look at (and maybe judge) himself. This 
thinking bears resemblance to the strategy of creating a “false” 
standard of objectivity that is supposedly neutral, like the “Martian 
standard” (Tindale, 2004). Such standards are false in that the 
objectivity they claim is a fiction. There is no Martian standard, for 
example; we cannot Google it to learn what is involved. It is simply 
a projection of the person who creates the standard, and thereby 
controls it. The strategy in question is more concrete and involves a 
real person–the author.
Descartes employs the device in the Preface to his last book, 
The Passions of the Soul (1649), a book that he was apparently 
reluctant to publish. The Preface consists of two letters to Descartes 
from an anonymous correspondent, advocating for the publication 
of the book, along with two short replies from Descartes. There is 
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the possibility that the author of the letters may have been one of 
Descartes’ regular correspondents, but the weight of scholarship 
favours the philosopher himself having authored both the letters 
and the replies (See Caton, 1982).9
The first letter begins by indicating directly Descartes’ reluctance 
to deliver himself of the treatise on the Passions he has promised 
because he had failed to provide it to the anonymous author. Motives 
for such reluctance are recounted, including a righteous indignation 
on Descartes’ part towards the ingratitude of the public for what he 
had previously accomplished, and the ignorance of commentators 
who have commented negatively. The anonymous author entreats 
and coaxes Descartes with praise of his accomplishments in terms 
that the principles of humility must dissuade any author of using 
explicitly for themselves: “there has never been anyone but you alone 
[...] who has discovered the true principles and recognized first causes 
of everything brought forth in nature” (1989, p. 5). Thus, there is 
irony in the request to abandon his “excessive modesty” and fulfill 
his obligations to science and the public (p. 7). Discounting the 
accomplishments of Aristotle (prone to error) and the Scholastics 
(uncertain reasonings), Descartes’ Method is championed as “so 
infallible” that he “never fail[s] to find out by means of it everything 
the human mind can about the things” he investigates (p. 10).
Eventually, the real likely cause of Descartes’ hesitation is brought 
to light with the identification of the high costs of such research, 
which the letter writer appreciates Descartes cannot undertake at 
his own expense. The writer ends by noting that although France 
is powerful enough to fund this research, “nevertheless, because the 
other nations have no less an interest in it than she does, I’m sure 
that many would be generous enough not to yield to her in that 
capacity” (1989, p. 15).
Interestingly, Descartes responds to this first letter that since it 
lists so much to his credit, people will suspect collusion between the 
9 Caton observes that anonymous authorship was common in the seventeenth century, 
although motives for such anonymity varied. Caton reviews the evidence and concludes 
that the Preface itself identifies its author directly as Descartes by virtue of several 
characterizations, chief of which is the author’s claim to know “by personal knowledge” 
Descartes’ intimate motives (1982, pp. 302-305).
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author and himself! He advises against publication, in part because 
he does not think the plan behind it will be successful, and also 
because it misreads his motives: he had refused the writer what he 
had written about the Passions only to avoid any obligation to show 
it to others who would not understand it.
The second, very short letter reiterates the plan to prompt those 
who have access to funds to procure them for Descartes’ work. And 
Descartes’ also short second reply explains that the delay in sending 
the treatise has been due to minor revisions, now complete, and 
hopes that those who read it “will take the trouble to examine it 
carefully” (1989, p. 17), for only such would a reader be satisfied.
We might observe of Descartes’ “anonymous” Preface that it 
is unlike the dialogue form used by other authors to explore ideas 
because it directly concerns Descartes himself and his work. And it 
is not self-deliberation between a self and a future self because here 
the conclusions have already been reached. What we are receiving is 
justification, plausibly the justification reached by Descartes through 
self-deliberation. The Preface is a device to convey the results of his 
internal dialogue. But why this device in particular?
Among the rhetorical strategies that seem favored by Wayne 
Booth is that of entering into conversations with various non-present 
others. It has the merit of making present ideas by personalizing the 
discussions and giving them a sense of process and immediacy. In 
his lengthy analysis of the philosopher Bertrand Russell’s rhetoric 
(Booth, 1974), for example, not only does Booth create a textual 
portrait of a variety of Russell’s representing different aspects of his 
work, he also at one point (about mid-way through the chapter) 
constructs a dialogue between himself and Russell (1974, pp. 68-73). 
My interest is not in the analysis of Russell’s thought that Booth 
provides, but in his strategy of analysis.
The “dialogue” consists of various series of quotes from Russell’s 
work and an immediate reply from Booth (identified as “Q”, 
presumably for questioner), and an occasional comment on the 
exchange in square brackets. For example, it begins:
R: “Man is a part of Nature, not something contrasted with 
Nature”.
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Q: I agree, but this seems to me to be precisely what you deny 
when you choose to rule out all of man’s values as irrelevant 
to Nature.
Since the quotes are drawn from Russell’s work, then the dialogue 
is not completely invented; Russell actually wrote the many quotes 
(there are 39 included, some quite long) that are all taken from the 
first chapter of his book What I Believe, published in 1925, over forty 
years earlier.10 But, of course, Russell didn’t write them so as to respond 
to Booth’s questions in the argumentative situation that has been 
created here, nor were they intended to address the overall concern 
governing Booth’s lecture. In this sense, the dialogue is artificial; 
Booth controls both sides of the “exchange” in the sense that he 
chooses what quotes to extract from Russell and how to arrange them 
in relation to his questions. Booth is not strictly talking to himself, 
but he is talking to a Russell that he has constructed from the text, 
an other that is being employed to support the points that Booth is 
making. As a strategy it personalizes the analysis by inviting Russell 
in, giving him a place in the performance, allowing him to speak 
in his own voice. But it is all filtered through Booth’s arrangement, 
particularly because Booth has identified three Russell’s in the 
philosopher’s writings–Russell I is the logician; Russell II the man of 
rational protest; and Russell III “the poet and mystic” (Booth, 1998, 
p. 47) –and while the dialogue engages a text belonging to Russell 
III, some of the responses concern the views of the other Russell’s. 
The pseudo-dialogue is an effective way to illustrate Booth’s claim 
that there is a “conflict between the three Russell’s” (1998, p. 52).
My point in drawing attention to the dialogue with “Russell” is 
to show that this is a rhetorical strategy that Booth favours as a way 
to make ideas present. More appropriate to the current discussion is 
the dialogue Booth has with himself, albeit an earlier version. This 
is a stronger companion case to that of the Descartes example.
Ostensibly, the purpose behind the dialogue with the younger 
self is to measure the changes that have taken place in his Mormon 
beliefs. The 14-year-old was a 100-percent devotee, fundamentalist in 
10 Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent is based on a series of lectures Booth gave at the 
University of Notre Dame in April of 1971.
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his views; the older Booth is still Mormon but without the strongly 
held beliefs. “The pious young believer and I have engaged in a 
variety of dialogues for going on seven decades”. And the boy has 
often been shocked by the changes in belief of the man he became. 
Now, the older Booth looks for reconciliation of a type:
Isn’t it time, I now ask my young self, to probe beneath the superficial 
“verbal” differences to the true grounds of our strongest convictions? Isn’t 
our real assignment, as we approach the new millennium, to discover what 
we share and then decide, probing our differences, just what can be cast 
aside? (1998, p. 2).
But the boy’s imagined responses are accusatory: the older man 
has betrayed his forbearers, can no longer be considered a Mormon, 
and holds metaphorically what he once took as literal. The older 
Booth is unrepentant. He believes there is more connecting them 
than dividing them: “But I go on arguing–as I shall argue here–that 
beneath our differences, he and I still share common ground that is 
far more important than our differences” (1998, p. 2). And that this 
serves as an introduction into Booth’s theory of rhetorology: “not 
rhetorical persuasion but rather a systematic, ecumenical probing of 
the essentials shared by rival rhetorics in any dispute” (p. 3). This 
leads to a long excursion through his journals, relaying events from 
his time as a Mormon missionary, as he encountered other rhetorics 
and learned to listen and modify his views through that listening 
(that is, through rhetorology).11
The dialogue with the 14-year-old self had simply been an entrée 
into a world of dialogues with others, all of whom had had something 
to teach him as he listened. Thus, the pseudo-dialogue in this case 
serves as an example of the value of dialogical listening that his form 
of rhetoric requires.
These are examples of self-deliberation. But the strategy is 
interesting, because the other self is disguised, cloaked in anonymity 
(Descartes), or in the person of a past self. So, this is not self-
deliberation as we have earlier seen it. The conclusions are already 
reached. This is a strategy of justification.
11  “What my practice of rhetorology as a missionary taught me was that if I pretended to 
listen sympathetically to beliefs I detested, I would sometimes discover that they were 
better beliefs than those I had held when entering the discussion” (Booth, 1998, p. 16).
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Consequences for Argumentation Theory and 
Further Research
The emergence of the study of argumentation schemes has a 
fascinating point of relevance with the current discussion because 
of the importance of certain schemes like the scheme for Practical 
Reasoning (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008). As presented by 
Walton et al. in their compendium of schemes, it has a markedly 
internalistic atmosphere to it.
Argumentation schemes are common patterns of reasoning that 
issue in conclusions judged defeasible in nature.12 The scheme for 
Practical Reasoning has the following structure:
Major Premise: I have a goal G.
Minor Premise: Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G.
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought (practically speaking) to carry out this 
action A (Walton et al., 2008, p. 323).
It will be immediately apparent that self-deliberation, as we have 
discussed it, is a far more complex process than what is suggested 
in this scheme. But each argumentation scheme is accompanied by 
a set of Critical Questions that are intended to assist any evaluator 
in judging the quality of an argument of that scheme. It is in the 
Critical Questions for the scheme for Practical Reasoning that this 
complexity comes to light. Walton and his co-authors provide five 
such questions:
CQ1: What other goals that I have that might conflict with G should be 
considered?
CQ2: What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also 
bring about G should be considered?
CQ3: Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is 
arguably the most efficient?
CQ4: What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for 
me to bring about A?
CQ5: What consequences of my bringing about A should also be taken 
into account? (Walton, et al., 2008, p. 323).
12  That is, they are drawn on the available evidence, but future evidence may lead to their 
modification or even refutation.
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Here in rich variety are the musings of the self with itself, weighing 
alternatives, identifying goals and coming to decisions. The very 
concept of a goal as conceived here (and by other argumentation 
theorists, like Gilbert and Hample) assumes a conception of self-
understanding and, beneath this, a conception of self along the lines 
I have discussed in this paper. This future-oriented self listens to 
itself as it provides answers to the critical questions. Here we would 
seem to have a modern version of what I described above as “assisted-
self-deliberation”.13
Finding self-deliberation embedded in contemporary 
argumentation schemes discloses a thread of focus running through 
modern argumentation studies. While central interests of social 
argumentation mean that the bulk of attention is directed to 
deliberating and arguing with others, we should not overlook the 
importance of arguing with the self and the relation this has to 
arguing with others.
Moreover, two important goals for such self-deliberative 
argumentation have come to light, depending on whether the arguer 
is concerned to justify a position already taken or provide reasons 
for the actions of a future self. More research on this distinction will 
likely produce frutiful results.
And there are further avenues of research suggested by what has 
been discussed. What is the role of self-deliberation, for example, 
in the relationship between conviction and persuasion? Agents are 
often convinced of things while not being moved to actions that 
support such conviction. We may be convinced of certain health 
hazards or of the harms of climate change without being moved to 
alter our behaviour in any way. What is required is uptake on our 
part, as the general concern becomes personalized. In other words, 
individuals need to become persuaded of things about which they 
already have the arguments to support conviction, and thereby 
moved to act on those arguments. This move from conviction to 
persuasion would seem to require self-deliberation.
13 The scheme for Practical Reasoning is not the only relevant one in the compendium 
provided by Walton et al. (2008). I use it simply to ilustrate my point. But other schemes 
that involve an internal dialogue include the Argument from Sunk Costs (2008, pp. 326-
327); Reasoning from Negative Consequences (p. 332); Argument from Plea for Excuse 
(p. 345); and Argument from Memory (p. 346).
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Finally, there are more practical applications for this work. For 
example, does the idea of an intelligent autonomous agent build on 
the traditional sense of self-deliberation? Douglas Walton (2016) 
defines an intelligent autonomous agent (IAA) as follows: “an entity 
that has the capability of forming goals and the capability of carrying 
out actions that it thinks might realize one or more of its goals. An 
agent in this sense can be a machine or a human (or an animal)” 
(2016, p. 2). While for Walton, this is a natural extension of how 
agency operates in argumentation schemes (and offers the promise 
of building intelligent systems that model human reason), for us this 
sounds remarkably like the self-deliberator of argumentation theory.
As we study the nature of deliberative argumentation in 
social and political situations, with all the importance granted to 
such study and the valuable results it promises, we should not lose 
sight of the single reasoner, deliberating with herself, justifying 
and anticipating, reconciling the past and deciding the future. 
Because such a deliberator underlies many of the issues that impact 
collective actions, and offers lessons useful for a fuller account of 
how argumentation operates in our societies 
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